I know
the arguments of the strategists, who point out that Von Kluck could
not afford to undertake the risk of entering Paris while an undefeated
army remained on his flank. They are obvious arguments, thoroughly
sound to men who play for safety, but all records of great captains of
war prove that at a decisive moment they abandon the safe and
obvious game for a master-stroke of audacity, counting the risks and
taking them, and striking terror into the hearts of their enemy by the
very shock of their contempt for caution. Von Kluck could have
entered and held Paris with twenty thousand men. That seems to me
beyond dispute by anyone who knows the facts. With the mass of
men at his disposal he could have driven a wedge between Paris and
the French armies of the left and centre, and any attempt on their part
to pierce his line and cut his communications would have been
hampered by the deadly peril of finding themselves outflanked by the
German centre swinging down from the north in a western curve, with
its point directed also upon Paris. The whole aspect of the war would
have been changed, and there would have been great strategical
movements perilous to both sides, instead of the siege war of the
trenches in which both sides played for safety and established for
many months a position bordering upon stalemate.
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