On the same
principle also, prudence is more desirable in old age; for no man
chooses the young to guide him, because he does not expect them to
be prudent. With courage, the converse is the case, for it is in youth
that the active exercise of courage is more imperatively required.
Likewise also with temperance; for the young are more troubled by
their passions than are their elders.
Also, that is more desirable which is more useful at every season or
at most seasons, e.g. justice and temperance rather than courage:
for they are always useful, while courage is only useful at times.
Also, that one of two things which if all possess, we do not need
the other thing, is more desirable than that which all may possess and
still we want the other one as well. Take the case of justice and
courage; if everybody were just, there would be no use for courage,
whereas all might be courageous, and still justice would be of use.
Moreover, judge by the destructions and losses and generations and
acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction is
more objectionable are themselves more desirable. Likewise also with
the losses and contraries of things; for a thing whose loss or whose
contrary is more objectionable is itself more desirable.
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