For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if
the same thing be a property of something that is the same as the
subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated not to be a
property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is called a
property of a man, in so far as he is a man, 'to have a tripartite
soul', it would also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a
mortal, to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful
also in dealing with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to
belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the
same.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that
are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in
kind as the alleged property: for then neither will what is stated
to be the property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a
property of a horse to stand by its own initiative, it could not be
a property of a man to move by his own initiative; for to stand and to
move by his own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong
to each of them in so far as each is an 'animal'.
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