Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are
primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a
job to render the property of such things. For if you render a
property as belonging to the subject that is so called after something
else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas
if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated
also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if
any one renders , coloured' as the property of 'surface', 'coloured'
will be true of body as well; whereas if he render it of 'body', it
will be predicated also of 'surface'. Hence the name as well will
not be true of that of which the description is true.
In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error
is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what
things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render
as the property of a thing something that belongs to it either
naturally, as 'biped' belongs to 'man', or actually, as 'having four
fingers' belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as
'consisting of most rarefied particles' belongs to 'fire', or
absolutely, as 'life' to 'living being', or one that belongs to a
thing only as called after something else, as 'wisdom' to the
'soul', or on the other hand primarily, as 'wisdom' to the 'rational
faculty', or because the thing is in a certain state, as
'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to a 'scientist' (for simply
and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be
'incontrovertible by argument'), or because it is the state
possessed by something, as 'incontrovertible by argument' belongs to
'science', or because it is partaken of, as 'sensation' belongs to
'animal' (for other things as well have sensation, e.
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