In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes
in rendering a property in the case of things that consist of like
parts a man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may
address himself to what is predicated of the part: and then in neither
case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to
the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the 'sea'
to be 'the largest volume of salt water', has stated the property of
something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute
of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not
'the largest volume of salt water'); and so the largest volume of salt
water' could not be a property of the 'sea'. Now take one referring to
the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of 'air' to
be 'breathable' has stated the property of something that consists
of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true
of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of
the air is not breathable); and so 'breathable' could not be a
property of 'air'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it
is on the other hand a property of them taken as a collective whole:
for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property.
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