Otherwise, there will be more than one definition of the
same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms that are prior
and more intelligible has also framed a definition, and a better
one, so that both would then be definitions of the same object. This
sort of view, however, does not generally find acceptance: for of each
real object the essence is single: if, then, there are to be a
number of definitions of the same thing, the essence of the object
will be the same as it is represented to be in each of the
definitions, and these representations are not the same, inasmuch as
the definitions are different. Clearly, then, any one who has not
defined a thing through terms that are prior and more intelligible has
not defined it at all.
The statement that a definition has not been made through more
intelligible terms may be understood in two senses, either supposing
that its terms are absolutely less intelligible, or supposing that
they are less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Thus
absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior, a point,
for instance, than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a
solid; just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number; for
it is the prius and starting-point of all number.
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