Thus e.g. suppose courage to have
been defined as 'daring with right reasoning': here it is possible
that the person exhibits daring in robbery, and right reasoning in
regard to the means of health: but he may have 'the former quality+the
latter' at the same time, and not as yet be courageous! Moreover, even
though both be used in the same relation as well, e.g. in relation
to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right
reasoning in respect of medical treatment), still, none the less,
not even this combination of 'the one+the other 'makes him
'courageous'. For the two must not relate to any casual object that is
the same, any more than each to a different object; rather, they
must relate to the function of courage, e.g. meeting the perils of
war, or whatever is more properly speaking its function than this.
Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the
aforesaid division at all, e.g. a definition of anger as 'pain with
a consciousness of being slighted'. For what this means to say is that
it is because of a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs;
but to occur 'because of' a thing is not the same as to occur '+ a
thing' in any of its aforesaid senses.
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