It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through a
long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those
already included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g.)
that one opinion is more properly so called than another, and
suppose him to make his postulates as follows: 'x-in-itself is more
fully x than anything else': 'there genuinely exists an object of
opinion in itself': therefore 'the object-of-opinion-in-itself is more
fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion'.
Now 'a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more
fully itself': and 'there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself, which
will be "opinion" in a more accurate sense than the particular
opinions': and it has been postulated both that 'a genuine
opinion-in-itself exists', and that 'x-in-itself is more fully x
than anything else': therefore 'this will be opinion in a more
accurate sense'. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning? Simply
in that it conceals the ground on which the argument depends.
12
An argument is clear in one, and that the most ordinary, sense, if
it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions
necessary: in another sense, and this is the type most usually
advanced, when the propositions secured are such as compel the
conclusion, and the argument is concluded through premisses that are
themselves conclusions: moreover, it is so also if some step is
omitted that generally is firmly accepted.
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