Dr. Meigs has elsewhere invoked "Providence" as the alternative of
accident, to account for the "coincidences." ("Obstetrics," Phil. 1852,
p. 631.) If so, Providence either acts through the agency of secondary
causes, as in other diseases, or not. If through such causes, let us
find out what they are, as we try to do in other cases. It may be true
that offences, or diseases, will come, but "woe unto him through whom
they come," if we catch him in the voluntary or careless act of bringing
them! But if Providence does not act through secondary causes in this
particular sphere of etiology, then why does Dr. Meigs take such pains to
reason so extensively about the laws of contagion, which, on that
supposition, have no more to do with this case than with the plague which
destroyed the people after David had numbered them? Above all, what
becomes of the theological aspect of the question, when he asserts that a
practitioner was "only unlucky in meeting with the epidemic cases?" (Op.
cit. p. 633.) We do not deny that the God of battles decides the fate of
nations; but we like to have the biggest squadrons on our side, and we
are particular that our soldiers should not only say their prayers, but
also keep their powder dry. We do not deny the agency of Providence in
the disaster at Norwalk, but we turn off the engineer, and charge the
Company five thousand dollars apiece for every life that is sacrificed.
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